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█ Abstract The central aim of this paper is to offer a historical reconstruction of phenomenological stud-
ies on dreaming and to put forward a draft for a phenomenological theory of the dream state.  
Prominent phenomenologists have offered an extremely valuable interpretation of the dream as an inten-
tional process, stressing its relevance in understanding the complexity of the mental life of subject, the 
continuous interplay between reality and unreality, and the possibility of building parallel spheres of expe-
rience influencing the development of personal identity. Taking into consideration the main characteris-
tics of dream experience emphasized by these scholars, in the final part of the paper I propose to elaborate 
a new phenomenology of dreaming, which should be able to offer a theoretical description of dream 
states. My sketched proposal is based on Eugen Fink’s notion of the dream as “presentification”. By com-
bining the past and the present of phenomenological investigation, I aim at suggesting a philosophical 
framework to explain the intentional features of dreaming as Erlebnis. 
KEYWORDS: Phenomenology; Dreaming State; Presentification; Erlebnis; Ego 
 
█ Riassunto La coscienza sognante: un contributo dalla fenomenologia – Lo scopo principale dell’articolo è 
offrire una ricostruzione storica degli studi fenomenologici sul sogno e proporre un abbozzo per una teo-
ria fenomenologia dello stato onirico. Importanti fenomenologi hanno offerto un’interpretazione partico-
larmente valida del sogno inteso come processo intenzionale, mettendone in rilievo il significato per la 
comprensione della complessità della vita mentale del soggetto, la continua interazione tra realtà e irreal-
tà, e la possibilità di costruire sfere parallele di esperienza che esercitano un’influenza sull’identità perso-
nale. Prendendo in considerazione le principali caratteristiche dell’esperienza onirica messe in luce da 
questi studiosi, nella parte finale dell’articolo propongo di elaborare una nuova fenomenologia del sogno, 
che dovrebbe essere in grado di offrire una descrizione teoretica degli stati onirici. Il mio abbozzo di pro-
posta si basa sulla nozione di “presentificazione” di Eugen Fink. Mettendo insieme il passato e il presente 
dell’indagine fenomenologica, il mio obiettivo è proporre una cornice filosofica per chiarire le strutture 
intenzionali del sogno inteso come Erlebnis. 
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ἄνθρωπος ἐν εὐφρόνη φάος ἅπτεται ἑαυτῷ  
Heraclitus 
 
FROM ITS VERY BEGINNING, WESTERN 
philosophy has dealt with the fascinating is-
sue of dreaming, taking into account the var-
ious meanings that the dream state may have 
for the mental life of an individual. Both Pla-
to and Aristotle considered the physiological 
aspects of dreaming processes,1 and Plato ex-
tended his enquiries to the role played by 
dreaming in his skeptical argument against 
the reliability of perception.2  
A similar argument was later put forward 
by Descartes in the first of his famous Medi-
tations,3 though Descartes in his Treatise on 
Man considered the purely 62 physiological 
nature of dreaming4 while Schopenhauer 
went as far as to question the very possibility 
of distinguishing between being awake and 
dreaming, thus supporting the definition of 
life as a “long dream”.5  
We can find Schopenhauer’s view in his 
deep reflections on the relationship between 
being awake and asleep elaborated by Heracli-
tus, as he says «Men asleep are laborers and 
co-workers in what takes place in the world».6 
However, despite being taken into considera-
tion, either as a mere physiological mecha-
nism or as a term of comparison with awake 
life, dreaming did not attract any highly 
elaborated philosophical enquiry. Not even 
phenomenology attempted such an enquiry, 
although it presents itself as a philosophy 
that specifically deals with the study of con-
sciousness.  
The main reason phenomenological re-
search ignored dreaming was the delimitation 
of its field of investigation to awake mental 
activities. This was recently reasserted e.g. by 
Dieter Lohmar, who excluded the possibility 
of examining the dream, as an “irrational”, 
“temporally disordered” phenomenon, which 
remains “ciphered” thus preventing phenom-
enological description and making it accessi-
ble only to psychoanalytic interpretation.7  
On the contrary, I believe that, precisely 
because phenomenology is a philosophy of 
consciousness (i.e., of mind), it cannot avoid 
dealing with dreaming, since dreaming repre-
sents the other side of our mental experience 
and is not, therefore, a separate part of it, but 
rather a sort of counterpart, essential to the 
functioning of the mind as a whole.  
The analysis I am about to present will of-
fer an overview of those thinkers, who repre-
sent eminent exceptions to the phenomeno-
logical tradition by virtue of devoting a part 
of their enquiry to the issue of dreaming; in 
my conclusion, I will outline a proposal for a 
new phenomenology of dreaming, which 
draws from some of the points elucidated in 
previous analyses.  
 
█  Edmund Husserl: Dream between percep-
tion and imagination 
 
Throughout his impressively extensive 
work, both published and unpublished, Ed-
mund Husserl devotes very few pages to 
dreaming, considering it a notion that is diffi-
cult to access from a phenomenological stand-
point.  
He basically uses the term dreaming in a 
negative sense contrasting dreaming with the 
authentic field of research of a phenomenolo-
gist, i.e. the awake life of transcendental sub-
jectivity. As an “unconscious” mental state, 
Husserl associates dreaming  with illusion and 
hallucination – both experiences in which 
there is no awareness of any contrast with the 
present/perceptual reality – and for this rea-
son dreaming is neither worthy or nor even 
accessible to investigation.    
In his texts, Husserl deals with the notion 
of dream mainly in four works: in volume 
XXIII of the series Husserliana,8 a letter ad-
dressed to Jean Héring in the 1930s,9 an un-
published manuscript dating back to the 
spring of 1933,10 and in a text from the 1920s 
now published as appendix XVII in volume 
XXXIX of the Husserliana.11 
The various writings gathered by Eduard 
Marbach in volume XXIII of the Husserliana 
cover a wide period, from the end of the 1800s 
to 1925, representing the richest source of in-
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formation on Husserl’s enquiries into the con-
cept of presentification (Vergegenwärtigung).  
Generally speaking, Husserl’s notion of pre-
sentification indicates all the acts of mental life 
that occur in the present, referring, however, to 
what is no longer, or is not yet, or cannot be 
present; hence it concerns the acts that make 
something present, i.e. that presentify some-
thing, as in remembering, expecting, imagining. 
In the text entitled Imagination and Image Con-
sciousness (Phantasie und Bildbewusstsein), 
which reproduces some of the lectures held in 
Gottingen in the winter semester 1904/05, 
Husserl develops some meticulous and careful 
analyses of the relations between these two dis-
tinct forms of conscious life, both expressions 
of presentification: imagination, meaning the 
direct, immediate reference of consciousness to 
a mental state that is not present; and image-
consciousness, indicating the experience of an 
object (the image), which mediates the rela-
tionship to the not-present.12  
Husserl begins his lectures by offering a 
general definition of imagination as different 
from experiences like dreaming, and estab-
lishes the relation to the present dimension 
as a criterion for this distinction. Imagination 
can be associated with expectation and 
memory considering that all these acts in the 
subject’s mental life can be contrasted with the 
representations (Vorstellungen) that result 
from perception, which in turn can also be de-
fined as “presentations” (Gegenwärtigungen) 
by virtue of being rooted in the present.  
Dreaming, like hallucination and illusion, 
allows for the appearance of something in a 
mode of presentation distinct from presenti-
fication, since its object is directly present as 
it appears, without any mediation by a pre-
sentification. Therefore, if the dream can be 
assimilated in imagination, with reference to 
something unreal, it cannot take the shape of 
a presentification.  
In an appendix to the lectures, Husserl 
clearly states that “being lost in a reverie, in 
the form of both night dreaming and day-
dreaming, does not involve presentifying 
(repräsentativ) consciousness”,13 because the 
continuous shining (schimmern) of awareness 
through the dream phases, i.e. the continuous 
passage from sleep to wakening, doesn’t al-
low for establishing a stable and clear conflict 
(Widerstreit) with the perceptual present. 
Such a conflict emerges instead in the case of 
authentic imagination, which brings to the 
present (reality) something not-present (un-
real) that “wants to be present”.14  
In imagination one finds the intention to 
compete (Wettstreit) with the present, but 
this intention is absent in the case of dream-
ing, which occurs in an unconscious state 
thus characterized by a form of presentation 
that lacks both qualities of awareness – that 
of imagination, i.e. the as-if (als ob), and that 
of presentifying which entails conflicts with 
current perception.15      
In a text written a few years after the 
1904/05 lectures, Husserl deals with the dis-
tinction between presentation and presentifi-
cation as regards the notions of actuality (Ak-
tualität) and inactuality (Inaktualität). Both 
notions play a significant role within the pre-
sentification process as well, since imagination 
is defined by two “basically different” con-
cepts: inactuality and presentification.16 As 
presentification, imagination can also take the 
guise of memory and expectation, which stand 
for acts determined by reference to a phe-
nomenon perceived as a primal impression.17  
The perceptual process, when original, 
triggers the process of the presentifying modi-
fications of memory and expectation, which 
enrich it with the modal quality of the not-
original material of imagination, i.e. the same 
material which constitutes the act of remem-
bering and expecting. In this case, Husserl ex-
plains, “not-original” denotes an actual pre-
sentification, whereas in the case of a purely 
imagined process one deals with inactuality, 
i.e. sheer representation. In a purely imagined 
process one cannot find a memory, but rather 
a quasi-memory, a quasi-consciousness of a 
perceived past; instead of an actual presentifi-
cation we have here a “quasi presentification”, 
i.e. an “inactual” presentification.  
Actuality always entails a reference to the 
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present (and thus to reality), while pure imag-
ination totally lacks any bond with the pre-
sent, that could allow for a normal spatial-
temporal development of consciousness’ men-
tal processes.  
In this respect, Husserl talks about imagi-
nation either as a presentification or as an in-
actuality. In presentification as inactuality, 
lacking any direct reference (Setzung) to the 
present, imagination is not subject to that con-
flict characteristic of presentification;18 hence 
it is presenting and not presentifying, and in 
this sense it is “quasi” presentifying. Now, 
even if only in this “weak” form expressed by 
the notion of quasi presentification, imagina-
tion as inactuality seems to allow for an evalu-
ation of dreaming as presentifying conscious-
ness, although inactual.     
Husserl clarifies this claim by noting that if 
we project ourselves into the perceptual world 
by the process of imagining (hineinphanta-
sieren), the dream becomes a part of this imag-
ining, which then contributes inactual char-
acteristics to perception itself:  
 
We could say that through the projection 
into reality by imagining (Hineinphanta-
sierung) the perceptual givenness under-
goes some modifications, which make it a 
compound of inactuality […] In the same 
way, an actual presentification too, by 
mixing with imagination, takes on the 
quality of dreaming.19 
 
Hence, the most Husserl concedes to the 
dream with regard to presentification is an 
indirect bond mediated by imagination in 
which the dream as inactuality is involved in 
the process of de-actualizing both the present 
sphere and the authentically presentifying 
sphere. (Nonetheless, in this passage the 
dream is presumably meant by Husserl more 
as an act of imagination than as an authentic 
act of sleep).20 As we pay attention to the re-
lation between this sheer imagination and 
the current world, the “unreality” of such 
quasi presentification takes the shape of a 
“nothingness”.   
In the 1930s, in answer a letter sent to 
him by Jean Héring, Husserl acknowledges 
the presenting activities of the dreamt ego, 
which is immersed in dreaming and lacks any 
conscious contact with reality, defining such 
an ego as a “pseudo-ego” living in a “pseudo-
world”.21  
The lack of authenticity characterizing 
the dream experience is reasserted by Husserl 
in another manuscript from the 1930s, where 
he describes the dream-world as “quasi-
existing, quasi-valid”. As we shall see, The-
odor Conrad takes up this very terminology 
in his analyses of dreaming. In conclusion, 
with reference to Husserl, he briefly deals 
with dreaming in a text written at the begin-
ning of the 1920s, in which he considers the 
dream experience as the formation of a “se-
cond” world for the one and the same ego. 
Nevertheless, he adds no significant novelty 
with his notion of dreaming characterized 
always as an “illusion”.22 
 
█  Eugen Fink: Dream as presentification 
 
In his remarkable and clever dissertation 
on Presentification and Image (Vergegenwär-
tigung und Bild), Eugen Fink23 supports a dif-
ferent interpretation of dream from the Hus-
serlian idea.  
Unlike Husserl, Fink includes the phe-
nomenon of dream among the presentifica-
tions, treating it as a more absorbing (ver-
sunkener) form of imagination. On the one 
hand, the mental state of dreaming is diffi-
cult to analyze, given that a phenomenologi-
cal reading must be based on the perfor-
mance  of an awake ego; but, on the other 
hand, Fink remarks that excluding an en-
quiry into dreaming already presupposes a 
specific idea of what dreaming is.  
Therefore, one should honestly recognize 
the aporias emerging from the notion of 
dreaming (e.g. as “temporal missing phase 
within the unitary process of the constitution 
of world”, or “incomprehensible irrational 
break”, “dark pause of experiencing life”), 
although one should also not forget  
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to adequately understand the constitutive 
sense of the “worldlessness” (Welt-
losigkeit) of the sleeper. “Worldlessness” 
is itself a specific mode of “having-the-
world” (Welthabe): it is “having-the-
world” in the extreme mode of absorption 
(Versunkenheit).24  
 
However, lacking the world, losing the 
world, doesn’t mean having no world, as if 
the dream were isolating psychic immanence 
from any reference to external reality. Alt-
hough it may sound paradoxical, reference to 
this world remains, but in the peculiar mo-
dality of loss: dreaming denotes exiting an 
awake relation to the world and entering into 
an absorbed relation.25 Precisely within this 
new relation dreaming constitutes a world 
(the “dream-world”, Traumwelt), wherein 
the subject continues to live according to her 
own consciousness whose features are trans-
ferred at the level of the dream level to the 
dream-world’s ego (Traumwelt-Ich).   
Suddenly transformed from an inaccessible 
phenomenon to an intriguing topic of phe-
nomenological study, Fink characterizes 
dreaming by the presentifying nature of this 
peculiar subjective mental state. More to the 
point, the presentifying nature of a dream is so 
deep and presents such a convincing alternative 
to the presentness (Gegenwärtigkeit) of the 
dreaming ego, that the dream stands for a pre-
sentification, in which all psychic performances 
in turn can only be presentifications:  
 
Every other presenting mental process 
would at least partially remove sleep […] 
The dream shows all the structures that we 
have emphasized as characteristic of pre-
sentifications.26  
 
This latter point marks Fink’s distance 
from Edmund Husserl’s view that dreaming,  
because it does not conflict with the present, 
is a presentation instead of a presentification. 
Thus, Fink somehow bypasses the classic 
phenomenological objection to the theory of 
dream as presentification, an objection based 
on the idea that dreaming lacks contrast with 
the current moment. This was the objection 
that Husserl considered to be the most per-
suasive proof of the impossibility of consid-
ering dreaming as presentification.  
According to Fink, if one takes into ac-
count the dreaming’s “absorbed” relation to 
its surroundings, such a relation doesn’t need 
anything else to develop into an aware con-
flict with the current reality; on the contrary, 
the more a mental state is absorbed, the 
greater the possibility to build an alternative 
to present reality. Precisely according to this 
new perspective, dreaming is regarded by 
Fink as the phenomenon of consciousness 
that is able to hold together all the structures 
existing separately in other presentifications 
(such as remembering, expecting etc.).  
Fink then chooses to measure the difference 
between dream and imagination not through 
the criterion of presentation/presentification, 
but through the degree of egological freedom 
involved in the two mental processes. Alt-
hough in the imagination-world the ego 
takes a passive role, Fink elucidates that:  
 
While there the imagination-world is the 
free creation of the imagining ego, totally 
at her disposal, with the increasing degree 
of absorption the staging freedom decreas-
es. The absorbed ego, deprived of her own 
will, produces in hidden passivity.27  
 
This peculiar form of ego, who dreams 
involuntarily, and then re-presents, i.e. inten-
tionally performs and constitutes something, 
highlights both the significant novelty of the 
phenomenological analysis of dream intro-
duced by Fink and the favoured access 
dreaming enjoys to the dimension of unreali-
ty. The way in which dreaming develops it-
self demonstrates the possibility of a subjec-
tive experience in a peculiarly unreal dimen-
sion, an experience deprived of the ego’s will.  
Dreaming unifies possibility and passivity, 
combining the presenting with the presentify-
ing aspects of mental life. Dreaming thus repre-
sents a sui generis presentification, which is 
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structurally linked to the presentness of the 
sleeping ego, while the dreaming ego performs 
her mental processes in “place” of conscious-
ness (Fink calls it “worin”, i.e. “wherein”) which 
unfolds as unreality (the not-present) operating 
simultaneously with reality (the present). Like 
imagination, the dream is a presentification 
that flows in conjunction with actual life, while 
referring to the absorbed state of the ego.  
However, with regard to the dream's de-
velopment, the “space” (worin) emerging in 
the present allows the dreaming ego, who is a 
totally absorbed ego, to live in actuality in the 
modality of in-actuality, to stay in the real 
through the unreal, to experience the world 
from a “different”, “other” world.  
Dreaming is the phenomenological notion 
which points to the most radical and authen-
tic shape of unreality, because it lacks any 
boundary between present and not-present 
which characterizes other forms of presenti-
fication (for instance, memory and anticipa-
tion), producing instead an unreality within 
(“worin”) reality. The dream causes a sort of 
short-circuit inside consciousness involving 
both the spatiality and the temporality of 
mental life. It is the opening of a gap, the cre-
ation of a space wherein the co-existence of 
reality and unreality, and of presence and 
not-presence, seems to be finally possible.  
While imagination and dreaming differ in 
their levels of passivity, they both share the 
quality of iteration by virtue of being presen-
tifications, although such iterability, in the 
case of dreaming, is deprived of the dream-
er’s ego will.  
Concerning the issue of waking up, Fink 
dissociates himself from the Husserlian ap-
proach: whereas Husserl, as we saw, focuses 
critically on the indefiniteness of the passage 
from dream to wakefulness, considering it one 
of the reasons to be skeptical about the phe-
nomenal solidity of dreaming, Fink elaborates 
an internal description of dreaming itself, con-
sidering the waking phase not as a path to 
wakefulness, but as a “dreamed” awakening, 
hence, as an awakening that remains im-
mersed within the dream dimension. It is 
worthwhile quoting here an entire passage, 
which testifies both to the meticulousness of 
Fink’s analysis and the fruitfulness of his con-
ception of dreaming as presentification:  
 
the first dream world, as long as the dream-
ing occurs without interruptions, is a “real 
world”; only afterwards, the conception of 
the previous dream world as a simply 
dreamed world is constituted in a new 
dream. The two iterations do not stand in a 
foundation relationship, but rather the 
“foundation” constitutes itself along with 
the constitution of the new dream. This it-
erative series, if it were actually possible to 
maintain the intentional encasement, could 
proceed ad infinitum never reaching a 
dream that would be at the basis of the 
“foundational nexus”. Hence, none of the 
iterations is “next” to the real I, i.e. the 
sleeping I; all of them are equally far from 
her, they all are dreams intertwined only by 
a dreamed foundational nexus.28  
 
As we deal here with a totally presentified 
nexus, that is completely internal to the un-
real relationship of consciousness, such a 
nexus is incommensurable with the present 
sphere of the sleeping and dreaming I. 
The understanding of presence is still es-
sential to the definition of presentification 
(just as presentification) in Husserl as well as 
in Fink, who concludes his remarks on 
dreaming referring precisely to the present 
dimension, in relation to which any presenti-
fication defines itself:  
 
The suggestive question, as to whether or 
not presenting is in the final analysis  also a 
dream from which I could “wake up”, is an 
absurdity in principle. As long as we can-
not interpret the presentness of sleep, we 
will not be able to establish a phenomeno-
logical demonstration regarding it.29 
 
This discussion of Fink’s position on 
dreaming allows us to emphasize its differ-
ence from Husserl’s standpoint. As Fink pre-
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sented his ideas in the text of his dissertation, 
one may wonder what Husserl himself – be-
ing the referent of the dissertation – thought 
of his pupil’s view.  
To my knowledge, none of Husserl's com-
ments on this issue have been preserved, alt-
hough he actually had the opportunity to come 
back to it. I refer here to a report by Dorion Ca-
rins30 of September 28th, 1931. At the end of a 
day, after a discussion addressing the topic of 
temporal flux and the status of the ego, Cairns 
reports that Fink started to talk about dreams. 
It is worth stressing the time when Fink begins 
to talk: «After we left Husserl, Fink was speak-
ing of dreams», Cairns writes.31 Fink, then, in-
troduced the topic of dreaming in the absence 
of Husserl, with whom he usually talked about 
any phenomenological issues as Cairn’s conver-
sation testifies.  
What does Fink say to Cairns that is so 
relevant that the latter chooses to recall it in 
his book, despite its being only a brief discus-
sion towards the end of the day and after the 
meeting with his mentor (it concerns the last 
three lines of the § XXII of the diary)? Cairns 
reports:  
 
After we left Husserl, Fink was speaking of 
dreams, which he understands as Vergegen-
wärtigungen <presentations, non-original 
presentations> rather than as Wahrneh-
mungen <perceptions>, as I am inclined to 
do.32 
 
Hence, Fink has just presented to Cairns 
his ideas on dream as presentification includ-
ed in the dissertation published the previous 
year (which Cairns evidently had not yet 
read). This very brief discussion with Fink, 
which took place at the end of a day during 
which greater and more basic phenomenolog-
ical issues had been discussed, such as time 
and subject, caught Cairns’ attention so much 
that some days later he decided to return to 
this issue in the presence of Husserl. 
Another very brief report dates back to 
October 3rd (three lines again) and starts with 
Cairns himself who urges Fink to discuss the 
issue of dreaming as a presentification: «I 
took up most of the time criticising or object-
ing to Fink’s theory that all psychic activity in 
sleep is Vergegenwärtigung»; unfortunately, 
although he had the opportunity to discuss 
this issue with his pupils, Husserl drew back: 
«Husserl added a bit here and there, but so 
far as I could see, we did not get very far».33 
 
█  Jean-Paul Sartre: Dream as story of subject 
 
In his psychological enquiry on imagina-
tion, which he develops along phenomeno-
logical lines, Jean-Paul Sartre34 devotes a part 
of his analysis to the concept of dreaming, an 
analysis defined by de Warren the “most sig-
nificant” of phenomenological tradition.35 
Starting with the quote from Descartes’ First 
Meditation, Sartre criticizes the skeptical the-
sis of the verisimilitude of dreaming by ob-
serving that the dream state is enabled by a 
form of unawareness, preventing it from as-
suming the shapes of a positing conscious-
ness, in which one places the existence of 
what is experienced:  
 
the position of the existence of the 
dreamer cannot be likened to that of the 
person who is awake, because in the one 
case the reflective consciousness destroys 
the dream by the very fact that it presents 
it for what it is, while in the case of per-
ception reflective consciousness confirms 
and reinforces the perception itself.36  
 
Sartre specifies that the “position” taken 
in perception must not be confused with “be-
lief”, i.e. with an affirmation of existence: 
while the former is a spontaneous act of con-
sciousness,  
 
the thesis represents the very nuance of 
intentionality. It is that which corre-
sponds, from the side of the noesis, to the 
noematic presence of the object itself.37  
 
On the basis of the noetic-noematic corre-
lation, Sartre shows how perception sets up a 
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direct, current relationship with the perceived 
object. The immediate evidence makes affir-
mation or belief superfluous, while the dream, 
lacking such a relationship to the present 
sphere of subjective life, takes the shape of an 
experience in which one is unable to posit any-
thing and just for this reason one is forced to 
blindly trust what one dreams:  
 
Everything that happens in a dream is 
something I believe. I do no more than 
believe in it: that is, the objects are not 
themselves present to my intuition.38  
 
The insurmountable distinction between 
dream and perception is basically due to the 
imagining mark of dreaming consciousness: 
 
The dream is a consciousness that is inca-
pable of leaving the imaginative attitude 
[...] the dream consciousness is complete-
ly deprived of the faculty of perceiving.39 
 
Although lacking a perceiving dimension, 
this doesn’t prevent dreaming experience 
from developing its own world; while the 
hypnagogic moment in isolation is not able 
to set up a whole range of consciousness rela-
tions, the dream reconstitutes instead an ex-
periential layer within which even each single 
phase contains something like a world.  
The opening of a new sphere of experience 
by the dreaming state determines the corre-
sponding opening of a “temporal world”, 
which one “abruptly” enters and which “ap-
pears to us as a story”.40 Once dreaming, the 
subject shifts her relation from the world to 
the dream state, from which she can never free 
herself, not even in an experience so unaware, 
and alienating as the dream state. The re-
creation of a world by dreaming consciousness 
is based on the need for a worldly relation felt 
by the ego, which can also transfer such a rela-
tion from perception to imagination: 
 
And this world closes on my conscious-
ness; I cannot free myself from it, I am fas-
cinated by it […] This world is sufficient 
unto itself, it can neither be dissipated nor 
corrected by a perception since it does not 
belong to the domain of the real. It is its 
very unreality which puts it beyond reach 
and which gives it a compact opacity and a 
strength […] the transition to perception 
can only occur by a revolution.41  
 
Being completely imaginary, the dream 
world, paradoxically, deprives dreaming of 
the basic trait of the imagination itself: free-
dom. The story the dream tells lacks an 
aware teller who is able to lead its develop-
ment, but rather occurs by itself according to 
an “unreal” logic. Being fully unreal, though 
not perceived as unreal, the dream continues 
to have the traits of a natural and irrefutable 
spontaneity:  
 
So, contrary to what might be believed, the 
imaginary world occurs as a world without 
freedom: it is not determined, it is the oppo-
site of free, it is necessary. Thus it is not 
conceiving other possibilities that the sleep-
er is reassured, saves himself from embar-
rassment. It is by the immediate production 
of reassuring events in the story itself. He 
does not say to himself: I could have had a 
revolver, but suddenly he does have a re-
volver in his hand. But too bad for him if at 
that very moment a thought should occur to 
him which in the waking state assumes the 
form of “what if the revolver had been 
locked!” This “if” cannot exist in the dream: 
this rescuing revolver is suddenly locked at 
the very moment when it is needed.42 
 
The example of a dangerous situation 
lived in the dream, i.e. a situation in which 
one feels in danger, allows Sartre to consider 
the subject’s involvement in the dream expe-
rience, which he defines as the appearance of 
the dreamer herself in the imaginary world 
opened by the dream. Sartre immediately 
specifies that this appearance doesn’t repre-
sent the entering of the real ego in the dream 
dimension, since this would imply self-
consciousness on the part of the sleeper, 
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which as such would break the dream state.  
The sleeper enters into the dream rela-
tions, created by herself, as an unreal ego, i.e. 
as an integral part of the dream experience 
and, as representative of dreaming con-
sciousness, she has at once a privileged posi-
tion. The appearing of the ego in the dream 
determines the personal involvement of the 
dreamer, who, enchanted by the dream state, 
doesn’t perceive its unreal nature, since it is 
impossible to distinguish perception from 
imagination from within a state where every-
thing is created by imagination.  
Hence, the unreal ego becomes the actual 
and unique character of the dream, and lives 
immersed in the dream world and, in doing 
so, she drags the whole emotional dreamer 
with her:  
 
Now, the feeling that is aroused is a feeling 
of belonging; in this imaginary world, in 
which one must be unreal if one is to enter 
it, an unreal me represents me, suffers, is in 
danger, even risks an unreal death which 
will put an end at once to me and to the 
world that surrounds me. An unreal game 
is going on with my unreal self as its stake. 
Now this condition of trance which cannot 
be completely realized in the reader (and 
which interferes with the aesthetic appre-
ciation of the book) is just what realizes it-
self in the dream.43 
 
The entering of the ego into the dream, 
which means the beginning of the dreamer’s 
personal involvement, transforms the dream 
experience from an observed show into a 
lived world. Such a peculiar state generates a 
splitting in the subject, formally similar to the 
splitting that occurs in every act of imagina-
tion, in which one imagines herself in a differ-
ent way than in the current state. Neverthe-
less, in the case of the dream, the two sub-
jects, the unreal ego and the sleeper ego, 
don’t experience this splitting equally, since 
their relation to the imaginary world is dif-
ferent. The unreal ego, who Sartre also de-
fines as “object-me” (objet-moi), experiences 
the unreal emotions caused by the direct in-
volvement in the dream, and she has no other 
existential dimension but the dream one.  
In contrast, the sleeper’s ego experiences 
such emotions only indirectly, precisely 
through her unreal ego, and in many cases 
she doesn’t suffer like her imaginary coun-
terpart, who Sartre calls, not by accident, the 
“representative” of dreaming consciousness.  
Only when nightmares occur, whose con-
tent also affects the sleeper ego, does the lat-
ter empathically experience the sufferings of 
the imaginary ego. However, while the unreal 
ego can’t exit the dream, since she is an inte-
gral part of it, the sleeper ego can free herself 
from the dream’s enchantment by awaken-
ing, – which, in the case of a pleasant dream, 
is the price to pay for recognizing the pleasure 
of a dream, – just like when the spectator 
breaks the spell of the performance by desir-
ing it to become real. In the case of a night-
mare, such awakening is sought with anxiety 
and in vain, because in spite of the sleeper’s 
efforts to wake up, «everything glides into 
fiction, everything is transformed in spite of 
him into imaginary».44  
Although it provokes the highest angst 
which is experienced by both the unreal ego 
and the sleeper, the dramatic epilogue of a 
dream leads in any case to the end of the 
dream, but not because it is «the fear that 
motivates the dream [...] but rather the im-
possibility of imagining an afterwards».45  
Closing his sharp remarks, Sartre states 
once more that dreaming does not ever consti-
tute a real experience, i.e. one perceived as real, 
but rather a story so well imagined that it en-
chants consciousness, which finds itself “knot-
ted” (nouée) by its own creation. Thus, the heu-
ristic function of the dream experience consists 
in helping us «to conceive what a conscious-
ness would be which had lost its “being-in-the-
world” and which would be, by the same token, 
deprived of the category of the real».46   
 
█  Jean Héring’s critique of Sartre 
 
In his review of Sartre’s essay, published 
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on Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
Jean Héring devotes a part of his synthetic 
remarks to the issue of dreaming.47 Based on 
the assumption that hyletic data can be expe-
rienced even while dreaming, as the dream-
er’s sensations of cold and hunger show, Hé-
ring addresses a radical critique of the core 
idea in Sartre’s analysis, i.e. the idea that 
dreams are not perceptions.48 
Although he agrees with Sartre on the fact 
that she who is dreaming creates a world rich 
in objects and situations, Héring claims that 
this constitutes the cognitive function of 
dreaming, which allows for the apprehension 
of reality. Such a claim does not entail that 
perception in dreaming has the same validity 
as perception in waking, since waking up 
“depreciates” the dream world. The sleeper 
may wake up either because an external signal 
intrudes on the dream state revealing its fic-
tive nature or because a sudden interruption 
breaks the tie between the dream world and 
the real world (a tie that in the first case, when 
an external signal intrudes on the dream state, 
can be maintained for a while).  
Nevertheless, it is possible to detect a per-
ceptual aspect of the dream state if one con-
siders the way a dream is often “encased” in 
another dream, thanks to an operation that 
can be repeated on different levels of mental 
life, without any level aspiring to demonstra-
tive validity “their epistemological status be-
ing zero”.49  
This focus on dream iteration is not in-
tended to attribute a cognitive value to 
dreaming beyond dreaming itself, but rather 
aims at explaining that dreaming is some-
thing other than an idea. As regards ideas, 
any idea contained in others continues to es-
sentially refer to them, while a dream at the 
second or third level, despite being contained 
in others, is autonomous, “self-sufficient” in 
its perceptual structure disregarding the 
dreams wherein it is encased.  
If during a dream (dream 1) I dream that 
I wake up (dream 2) and then I actually wake 
up, the integrity of dream 1 is not influenced 
by dream 2 – which, being itself a dream, 
doesn’t interrupt the dream state belonging 
to either iteration – but rather vanishes along 
with dream 2 only at the time that I actually 
wake up. By contrast, if during a preparation 
for an exam a student imagines he has al-
ready written the work he will do, and in do-
ing so he remembers both the handbook and 
some pages from it, the idea of the handbook 
(idea 2) is encased in the idea of the perfor-
mance of the exam (idea 1), and beyond this 
relation it has no autonomous meaning.  
According to Héring this difference be-
tween dream and idea is due to the fact that 
any idea is a modification of a perception, of 
which it constitutes an unfulfilled copy, while 
the dream is not a dream of a perception, but 
is in turn a perception presenting an original 
experience which does not modify that origi-
nal experience.50 This difference is also illus-
trated by the contrast that one experiences 
when one wakes up, when the dreamed per-
ception loses all its value. Even if the dream 
reveals its fictive nature, as reflecting con-
sciousness destroys the dream belief, as Sar-
tre states, the dream can’t be assimilated to 
an idea that has only those imaginative quali-
ties to which the complexity of dreaming 
cannot be reduced. 
 
█  Jan Patocka: The superiority of the real to 
dreaming 
 
At the beginning of the 1940s, Jan 
Patočka published a brief essay on the issue 
of dreaming paying special attention to the 
problem of solipsism.51 After citing the ex-
amples of both classic skepticism and of Des-
cartes as attempts to undermine the belief in 
the real through the objection of a dreamed 
reality, Patočka emphasizes Pascal’s revival 
of these topics.  
He extensively quotes Pascal’s remark 
concerning the possible equivalence of reality 
and dreaming, whose differences are only 
“relative” to the extent of concordance and 
order in their respective apparitions. No 
wonder, Patočka remarks, that at the end of 
the XVII century this theoretical soil sup-
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ported the elaboration of the theory of solip-
sism through the argument of the coherent 
dream. Phenomenological philosophy, as 
ego-centered, seems to be unable to ade-
quately answer the following question: 
«What guarantee do we have that existence 
as a whole is not a more or less organized 
dream?».52 
In order to refute the argument equating 
dreaming and reality, Patočka studies a simi-
lar thesis which aims to negate the existence 
of the past due to the unreliability of recollec-
tions. Since it is possible to invent a past by 
means of the imagination, no one can assure 
us that the past has actually occurred. Ac-
cording to Patočka, this thesis presupposes 
what it wants to deny, i.e. the notion of the 
past, and thus reveals the weakness of its rea-
soning. Even if we don’t have any certain 
recollection or we substitute it with an imag-
ined one, neither the first fact nor the second 
are able to change the entire meaning of the 
concept of past. The reality of the past 
doesn’t depend on the recollection we have 
of it, but rather the latter presupposes the 
former. 
Hence, whereas a recollection, though il-
lusory, can’t undermine our belief in the past, 
the dream as “compact illusion” seems to be, 
on the contrary, a valid alternative to tangi-
ble reality. Patočka’s refutation of such an 
argument begins with an explicit reference to 
Fink’s Dissertation, to which he already de-
voted a brief review.53 Citing the radical pas-
sivity of the dream experience, Patočka pro-
ceeds to stress the absence of a future per-
spective in any dreamed situation and the re-
lated impossibility of recollecting it.  
The full powerlessness (Ohnmächtigkeit) 
of the dreamer shows the intrinsic fleeting-
ness (Flüchtigkeit) of the dream dimension, 
whose disorder doesn’t allow it to be equated 
with the real dimension. Patočka denies that 
a symmetric passage from reality to dreaming 
exists, as if falling asleep were a sort of re-
awakening in a new sphere of experience, 
since waking up means coming “back to one-
self”, “regaining consciousness (sich seiner 
selbst zu besinnen)”, hence re-possessing the 
skill to master the real world that is “unique 
and homogenous (einzig und einheitlich)”. 
Conversely, the passage from dream to reali-
ty is not the shifting from an order to another 
order, i.e. from a reality to another reality, 
but it happens rather «only by dissolving the 
trick: it is the recovery of the unique and real 
I, and along with her of the real world».54  
Thus, no solipsism can be legitimated by 
the theory of the coherent dream, because 
the dream as such has no coherence nor can 
aspire to be another reality, which could call 
into question the unique and absolute reality, 
precisely since it is this latter reality which 
makes dreaming possible. 
 
█  Theodor Conrad: The real illusion of 
dreaming 
 
The issue of dreaming is also meticulously 
analysed by Theodor Conrad, most specifi-
cally in On the eidetic Doctrine concerning psy-
chic Life and Experience (Zur Wesenslehre des 
psychischen Lebens und Erlebens), a text writ-
ten in the first half of the 1940s, but pub-
lished only in 1968. There, Conrad deals with 
the complex question of psychic life and its 
constitutive acts. In the third chapter, Con-
rad introduces the topic of dreaming as a pe-
culiar state of subjective relation to reality. 
Right from the beginning, he specifies that 
the dream-world is not in opposition to the 
awake world, which more properly stands in 
opposition to sleeping; the dream-world is 
instead the opposite of the real world.  
The extent of such opposition becomes 
clear as we consider that starting to dream 
means starting to building up a proper world, 
which can’t include any part of reality, given 
its clear detachment from the world of reali-
ty. It is impossible precisely because of the 
alternative character of the dream-world, 
which completely absorbs us and prevents 
any form of control or capacity by interven-
tion from the dimension of the real. There-
fore, Conrad explains that entering into the 
dream-world requires acknowledging that  
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the real world no longer exists in front of 
us, but there is another world, an illusory 
world. Even if we could master this illuso-
ry world, it is impossible, given the condi-
tion of detachment from the real world, 
that such control be a part of the authen-
tic and absolute control of the awake state 
that exists in that real world.55 
 
The state of full absorption characterizing 
the dreamer leads her to accept without hesi-
tation the new world created outside of the 
real world; this self-deception means the 
dream is not a variation on awake life, but ra-
ther a different layer. In order to further clari-
fy the detachment of the dreamer from the 
reality in which the dreaming occurs, Conrad 
plainly distinguishes between the daydream 
(Träumerei) and the dream (Traum).  
While the latter stands for the building of 
another dimension, wherein one doesn’t care 
anymore about the actual sphere of the real, 
the former stands in the middle between the 
active and aware involvement of being awake 
in reality and the state of total alienation of 
dreaming. From this perspective, the day-
dreaming ego experiences a splitting (Ichgabe-
lung) that allows her to continue to feel tied to 
the sphere of the real i.e. that allows her to put 
the fictional in relation to reality.  
As such, the daydream sometimes precedes 
the authentic dreaming state (this refers to the 
hypnagogic phase analysed by Sartre); precisely 
whenever one considers it as the phase that 
immediately occurs before the dream, one un-
derstands that the dream is the radicalization 
of the first form of farewell to reality 
(Wegversetztheit) in daydreaming, which then 
leads to the authentic state of absorption (Ver-
sunkenheit) in an all-encompassing fiction.56  
Conrad explains that one suddenly loses 
the difference between the “here” of the pre-
sent, wherein the daydreaming happens, and 
the “there” in which the daydreamt content is 
located. Given full immersion in the new di-
mension of dreaming, and the correlative 
opening of a new world, the daydreamt 
“there” coincides with the “here” of day-
dreaming, since both are set within the dream-
world which no longer has reference to reality. 
The ego no longer experiences a splitting, but 
rather she reassembles herself in the unity of 
dreaming, in much the same way that the divi-
sion between a “here” and a “there” has been 
overcome in the unique space now in force, 
i.e. the space of the new dream reality. The 
trick, the deception of dreaming, lies just in 
this realization of living in a self-sufficient, au-
tonomous reality, wherein it is possible to live 
any kind of experience as if one were awake.57  
Once it is established that this is the sol-
idness of the dream experience, one should 
wonder whether the dream deals with repre-
sentations (Vorstellungen), i.e. with images 
that refer to something not present58, or with 
perceptions which, despite their appearance, 
are deceptive. Conrad has no doubt in this 
regard: dream visions are perceptions (agree-
ing with Jean Héring and disagreeing with 
Sartre).  
Nevertheless, in this context one has to 
point to a meaning of perception that be-
longs in turn to a wider notion of representa-
tion as a mental process presenting some-
thing in front of us (vor-uns-stellen). In the 
dream, an object doesn’t present itself (sich 
präsentiert), as in the case of a perception of 
something real, but rather gets presented 
(wird präsentiert), as in a representation. Yet, 
although the dream has the form of a repre-
sentation, it maintains the characteristics of 
perception, since the presented object doesn’t 
refer to something absent that gets re-
presented,59 but it is rather performed by the 
dreaming subject, who presents the dreamt 
object to the ego living in the dream, called 
by Conrad the “dreaming onlooker”.  
In short, in the relation between the awake 
ego and reality, the object presents itself by 
itself (it is self-given), while in the dream state 
the object is presented by the dreaming ego to 
the onlooker-ego (it is given). Within the 
dream, the relation is threefold: (1) Dreaming 
ego; (2) Dream reality (performed by the 
dreaming ego, who presents the dream-
world); (3) Dreaming onlooker (to whom the 
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dream-world is presented). 
Conrad establishes then a clear distinc-
tion between, on the one hand, the dreaming 
ego and her surroundings and, on the other 
hand, the dream-ego (i.e. the onlooker, the 
dreamer involved in the dream) and her sur-
roundings, i.e. the dream-world. In this re-
spect, Conrad talks about two distinct 
dream-layers: (1) what is dreamt in the 
dream; (2) the mental process that occurs in 
the dream. The first layer stands for the ma-
terial of the dream, while the second one can 
be defined as its experiential content. 
Whereas the material of the dream shows its 
deceptive appearance when the dreamer 
wakes up, the existence of the mental process 
of the dreamer is not illusory at all, since she 
has really experienced various sensations 
during the dream state.  
This remark allows Conrad to point out 
another basic difference between dreaming 
and daydreaming: while in the latter case one 
can experience different situations maintain-
ing a playful, disenchanted attitude, the state 
of total engrossment characterizing the 
dream makes it a “hard reality”, which also 
explains its deceptive nature as articulated by 
the expression “as if we were awake”.  
Echoing points made by both Fink and 
Sartre regarding the subject’s condition of 
complete entanglement in the dream, Con-
rad stresses «how much our dream experi-
ence is authentic».60  
In contrast to the daydream, which de-
notes a mental process of displacement into 
the two layers of reality and imagination, the 
dream is an “absolute” mental process of dis-
placement, since it completely relocates the 
subject in the dream-reality. Nevertheless, 
the production of a space actually other than 
the space that the dreaming ego occupies in 
the real world doesn’t signify an actual relo-
cation of the subject. Despite the “hard” reali-
ty of the dream state its space consists in a 
“spiritual”, “phenomenal” locus, a “quasi-
location (Quasi-Standort)”, a “location bor-
rowed (geliehen)” from reality.61 Accordingly, 
the peculiar relation formed between the sub-
ject and the dream-world is a “quasi-relation 
(Quasibezug)”, i.e. a relation, wherein what 
happens is not real, but as if it were real. 
Nonetheless, considering the full immer-
sion in this “quasi-reality” prevents any lucidi-
ty about the experiential truth in which we are 
involved, Conrad emphasizes that one is not 
able to live the dream as an absolute mental 
process of displacement, but rather, paradoxi-
cally and “grotesquely”, one lives the dream as 
a localized experience, namely without any 
shift in consciousness: «Dream is a mental 
process of displacement disguised as a mental 
process of non-displacement!».62 
 
█  The past and the present of the phenom-
enology of dreaming 
 
In order to sum up the main positions ex-
pressed by the authors discussed above, we can 
observe that all scholars attribute the following 
to the dream-experience: absorption, entan-
glement, splitting, transformed relation be-
tween the subject and her space/time. It is also 
possible to clearly detect some differences be-
tween each author, basically due to diverse 
views on the intentional nature of dreaming.  
In Sartre, the dream develops as a story in 
virtue of a mental process that is entirely imag-
inary, in which there is no room for any percep-
tual activity that would destroy the dream-
world. Fink in some sense anticipates Sartre’s 
position, stressing the opposition between 
dream as presentification and perception as 
presentation, and depicts the life of the dreamt 
ego in its autonomy from awake life. Overcom-
ing the contrast between the perceptual layer 
and the one of dreaming by describing dream-
ing as a mental state with the appearance of 
representation and the characteristics of per-
ception, Conrad shifts his attention to the anal-
ysis of the effects of dreaming on the subject, 
who experiences the peculiar mental process of 
a displacement which is experience, however, 
as a not-displaced condition.    
These authors of the phenomenological 
tradition (which we can also call the classic 
phenomenology of dreaming) who addressed 
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the issue of dreaming, despite the thorough-
ness and richness of their analyses, did not go 
on to develop an effective dialogue, with the 
exception of Patočka’s already mentioned 
reference to Fink’s Dissertation, and a similar 
allusion by Héring,63 where he regrets that 
Sartre was not aware of Fink's text, and a 
footnote in Conrad64 referring to the French 
version of Héring’s article. More to the point, 
we already mentioned Husserl’s refusal to 
himself to address this question with Fink 
and Cairns.    
In the last few years, a novel though spo-
radic interest in the issue of dreaming has 
emerged in phenomenology. Hans Rainer 
Sepp65 presents two analytical descriptions 
both historical and theoretical of the phe-
nomenology of dreaming; Julia V. Iribarne66 
emphasizes the relevance of the dreaming 
experience for the life of the ego; Christian 
Ferencz-Flatz67 presents a very remarkable 
reflection on the notions of dreaming and 
imagination in Husserl and Fink; James Mor-
ley68 focuses on the originality of Merleau-
Ponty’s interpretation of dreaming as a basic 
aspect of the imaginary.   
In his recent essay on this topic, Nicolas 
De Warren69 suggests an actually intriguing 
approach to dreaming experience, as the 
“pre-reflective self-awareness” of the dream-
ing subject. According to De Warren, one of 
the historical objections to the cognitive va-
lidity of the dream experience, for instance 
by Leibniz,70 was the absence of the aware-
ness by the dreamer of the fact that she was 
dreaming.  
This objection was based on the equation 
of self-awareness and wakefulness. Suggesting 
a different perspective, de Warren talks about 
the dreamers’ self-awareness not of the 
dreaming, but rather “in” the dreaming. The 
dreamer becomes the subject of dreaming not 
as someone who is aware that she is dreaming, 
but as someone who is aware as dreaming. 
Thus, it is possible to develop a philosophical 
evaluation of the dream experience as a very 
peculiar phenomenon in mental life, in which 
the subject undergoes a self-modification 
without losing personal identity.  
With the authors discussed above, espe-
cially Fink and Conrad (he doesn’t refer to 
Sartre’s analyses), de Warren shares the no-
tion of ego-splitting and the status of absorp-
tion as conditions of the dream experience. 
Unlike Fink, however, he doesn’t see the 
dreamt ego as similar to an awake one living 
in her own world, but rather conceives of the 
ego who is dreaming as the expression of a 
consciousness continuing to refer to what 
remains from the day’s experience on the ba-
sis of processes of passive synthesis. In this 
respect, the ego receives her materials and 
motivations for dreaming from awake life 
and she experiences such materials and moti-
vations while endorsing the form of the split-
ting dreaming ego/dreamt ego.  
Thus, it would be possible to recover a 
genuine Husserlian sense of dream despite 
the fragmentary interest devoted by Husserl 
himself to the phenomenon of dreaming. Ac-
cording to this view, the dreamt ego is a pe-
culiar form of modification of the self-
affection of consciousness and is named by 
de Warren an “under-determined” or “flat-
tened” ego, who is “unhinged and unmoored 
from oneself”.71 Echoing some remarks by 
both Conrad and Sartre, de Warren72 stresses 
that the condition of dreaming is that dream-
ing consciousness cannot appear “as itself 
dreaming” because of its being “beholden to 
the imaginary”.  
Neither aware that she is dreaming nor 
unaware in that dreaming, subjectivity de-
velops in dreaming a third life as a “medial 
voice” of consciousness, which constantly 
remains on the threshold of a fully perceptual 
experience. 
 
█  New phenomenology of dreaming: Sketch 
of a proposal 
 
The reconstructed phenomenology of 
dreaming can be presented as an incoherent 
path; by this, I mean that reflection on the is-
sue of dreaming has never represented a con-
stitutive part of the whole phenomenological 
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investigation, but rather, as we have seen, has 
constituted from time to time a fragment of 
the enquiry elaborated by several phenome-
nologists, who never undertook the task of 
thoroughly dealing with the mental state of 
dreaming. As a result, there is no systematic 
assessment of dreaming by phenomenology.  
The first reason for such an absence can be 
identified in Husserl’s refusal to investigate 
the dream state himself for the aforemen-
tioned arguments. The recovery of the issue of 
dreaming by Fink, Sartre, and Conrad didn’t 
develop into a wider evaluation of this issue 
but remained just an element in their thought, 
although interesting and worth analyzing. 
More to the point, such investigations offer a 
series of suggestions concerning a set of con-
cepts that play a decisive role within phe-
nomenology and philosophy in general, such 
as: the absorbed mental state, the relation be-
tween reality and unreality, the meaning of 
reality, the status of subjectivity with regard 
to unreal experiences, the notion of self, the 
plurality of worlds.73 Maybe, if Husserl had 
devoted more space to an enquiry into dream-
ing, we would now have a phenomenology of 
dreaming in addition to a phenomenology of 
attention, perception, memory, imagination, 
to mention the mental states, and body, inter-
subjectivity, and feelings, to mention states 
other than mental ones.  
On the other hand, further reasons for the 
absence of a phenomenology of dreaming – 
systematically developed – may arise due to 
the correlative absence of a philosophy of 
dreaming. There is no philosopher who made 
dreaming the core of his/her reflection, alt-
hough we have many thinkers who dealt epi-
sodically with the issue of dreaming. We cit-
ed a few in our Introduction. This exclusion 
of dreaming from the field of philosophical 
enquiry is generally due to the difficulty of 
investigating a totally74 unconscious mental 
state and, in the last century, to the preemi-
nence of both psychoanalytical and neurosci-
entific approaches to the dreaming state.75  
In the contemporary philosophical field, 
two significant critiques of the attempt to 
philosophically investigate the dream state 
have come from Norman Malcolm and Dan-
iel Dennett.76 Disregarding their differences, 
both authors share the view that dreaming is 
a mental state lacking experience, where they 
identify “experiencing” with “being con-
scious”.77 Since while dreaming one is not 
aware of one’s own mental performance, it is 
not possible to offer a conceptual reading of 
the act of dreaming. Such a reading would 
indeed presuppose some form of conscious-
ness, however in this case we would be deal-
ing with a mental state that, if conscious, 
even partially (Malcolm’s notion of “half 
sleep”),78 is not an authentic dream state. 
This view is based on the equivalence of con-
sciousness and awareness, according to 
which there is no experience that is not a 
conscious/aware experience, and in this case 
we would have an experience of which one 
can’t talk of.79  
I believe the phenomenological idea of 
experience as Erlebnis, i.e. a mental process 
lived as such, regardless of the level of aware-
ness, allows us to distinguish between con-
sciousness and awareness and to identify 
“experiencing” with “being conscious” in the 
sense of “having consciousness” and not “be-
ing aware”. Thus, one can in principle inves-
tigate any form of consciousness, both con-
scious and unconscious, because mental ac-
tivity coincides fully with consciousness.80    
In order to outline a phenomenological 
theory of dreaming, I believe one has first to 
find a common definition in phenomenolog-
ical terms. I suggest we refer to dreaming as a 
“presentification”, because this term, explic-
itly proposed by Fink, although it is in con-
flict with Husserl’s view, includes both the 
feature of imagination highlighted by Sartre 
and the trait of a displacing mental act elabo-
rated by Conrad, which I together consider 
to be basic characteristics of the dreaming 
state.81 Of course, the definition of dream as 
a presentification entails a rejection of the 
hallmark of presentification worked out by 
Husserl himself, i.e. the awareness of a con-
trast with perceived reality.  
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In so doing, I am aware I am in the com-
pany of Fink (who is indeed very good com-
pany), and remain isolated from the phe-
nomenological mainstream. Nonetheless, I 
believe that Fink’s view, allows us to open up 
a new field of inquiry in phenomenology to-
wards a more comprehensive understanding 
of mental life. The idea of the dream as a pre-
sentification is worked out by Fink within a 
more general evaluation of the subjective 
condition of experiencing.82 At first, he talks 
of the very common condition of attention 
and lack of attention; second, he introduces a 
specific condition linked to the mental state 
of presentification and expressed by the no-
tion of the “rhythm” (Tempo) of presentifica-
tion. It specifically concerns those cases of 
presentification in which the ego is free to 
decide how to reproduce a lived experience; 
the peculiar aspect of the rhythm of presenti-
fication consists in its coinciding neither with 
the time of the present nor with the time of 
presentifying.  
While being generated by the encounter 
between the “time of remembering” and the 
“time of remembered”, the rhythm of presen-
tification breaks with the normal temporal 
proceedings of consciousness. Finally, the 
third mode of experiencing is the one of 
“deep absorption” (Versunkenheit): Fink’s 
idea of such a mental state is the key element 
in thoroughly modifying the Husserlian the-
ory of presentification. If one thinks, follow-
ing Husserl’s idea, that the essential feature 
of the mental state of presentification is its 
“contrast” with reality, a contrast that the 
presentifying ego “consciously” experiences, 
then the only state in which a presentifica-
tion can be performed is in the “awake” state. 
Nonetheless, one may ask, following Fink, 
whether or not is it right to claim that «the 
phenomenological sense of the “unreality” of 
imagination refers to the difference in clarity 
between an imaginative and an original expe-
rience?».83 
Provided that we accept this contrast 
(“whose meaning is questionable”, Finks 
adds), we have it «only in those presentifica-
tions for the realization of which the ego is 
awake, namely she is open to her original 
world of the present, where she experiences 
through perceptions».84  
Only in this case, where the presentifica-
tion takes place consciously along with per-
ception, does one experience a situation of 
contrast among the different levels of per-
formance of consciousness. And only in this 
case do «the simultaneous memories charac-
terize themselves as experiences of the world 
according to the as-if mode, the fanciful im-
ages as “simple” fanciful images».85  
Nevertheless, Fink goes on, there is  also a 
“contrary” state to the awake state, i.e. the 
state of deep absorption, in which within the 
route of intuitive fulfillment consciously 
lived by ego, a fragment with such a strong 
affective force emerges, that the ego «fully 
forgets her original present, isolates herself 
from every time-passing tendency, and pri-
marily and mainly lives in remembering».86  
Fink explains that once it is understood 
that this subjective state of absorption plays a 
fundamental role in the life of consciousness, 
one can comprehend that being awake 
doesn’t exhaust the range of possible presen-
tifying experiences, for it represents only the 
case in which presenting determines by con-
trast the imaginative quality (the quality of 
the as-if) of presentifying; when the ego 
gradually dives into her presentifying world, 
as happens in pathological imagination, in 
obsession, or in a dream, the presenting dis-
appears from subjective attention and the 
presentified seems to be something not mere-
ly imagined, but something real. If one ac-
cepts this interpretation, Fink says, one has 
to radically modify the phenomenological 
analysis of presentification, that  
 
must free itself precisely from taking the 
“as-if” as the fundamental characteristic 
determining its classification. Rather, the 
as-if is only the basic trait for describing 
all those presentifications performed by 
an awake ego, namely an ego open to her 
impressional present […] Only in the be-
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ing-awake of a current ego, in contrast 
with the clarity of actually experienced 
objects, does presentifying emerge as a 
quasi-experience in which that quality of 
as-if is constituted for the ego. Hence, on-
ly in the attitude of being-awake does one 
experience what is imagined as imagined, 
what is unreal as unreal.87  
 
More to the point, if one considers the 
“reality” of experience as the only criterion 
that determines its originality, presenting 
consciousness alone reaches such originality, 
from which all ways of presentification are 
excluded; nonetheless, it is possible to define 
such a form of originality as “primary” and to 
enlarge the notion of originality to embrace 
«any kind of consciousness in which some-
thing reveals itself as such […] whether it is a 
horizon, a something unreal or possible».88 
From this new perspective,89 presentifica-
tions acquire a “secondary” grade of original-
ity and give access to the temporal horizons 
of past and future. And as such, they allow us 
to consider the absorbed life of ego as a very 
relevant part of her intentional life, even in 
the absence of a conscious contrast with pre-
sent experience. 
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